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Jainism proposes a unique theory of reality in which the extreme positions of absolute 
identity and permanence on the one hand and absolute difference and change on the other 
are avoided in favour of integrative ontology. Here, identity and difference as well as 
permanence and change are coordinated. The vertical and horizontal descriptions of the 
nature of reality are reflected in the basic definitions of substance and existence. This paper 
examines how this ontology is outlined in the works of Kundakunda and Umāsvāti.  
Keywords: Jainism, ontology, identity, difference, permanence, change 
Izvleček 
Džainizem predlaga edinstveno teorijo stvarnosti, ki v prid integrativni ontologiji obide 
skrajni stališči absolutne identitete in stalnosti na eni strani ter absolutne razlike in 
spremembe na drugi. Razmerje med identiteto in razliko ter stalnostjo in spremembo je 
opredeljeno kot koordinativno. Vertikalen in horizontalen opis narave stvarnosti se 
odražata v temeljnih opredelitvah substance in eksistence. Pričujoči članek preiskuje, kako 
je navedena ontologija zastavljena v delih Kundakunda in Umāsvātija. 
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This paper will investigate the Jain ontological
1
 model, which is frequently 
referred to as an identity-in-difference and a permanence-in-change view of reality. 
In the course of outlining the Jain ontological position, the texts of two 
philosophers, namely Kundakunda and Umāsvāti, will be predominantly addressed. 
This choice rests on the fact that these two figures pioneered the systematization of 
Jain doctrine, explicating the basic tenets of Jain philosophy. The main texts 
consulted will be Kundakunda’s Pañcāstikāyasāra (Pks), Pravacanasāra (Ps), 
Samayasāra (Ss) and Niyamasāra (Ns),2 as well as Umāsvāti’s Tattvārthasūtra3 
(Ts).
4
 After drafting the general ontology of Kundakunda and Umāsvāti, this 
article will examine their basic definitions of existence and substance as well as 
critically analyse the relation between the two. Next, two ways of studying 
substance will be attended to, namely vertical (non-temporal) and horizontal 
(temporal). Through this a comprehensive model of reality according to early 
systematizations of Jain thought will be summarized.  
The Jain ontological model is unique in the context of Indian philosophies in 
so far as it refuses to agree with any of the absolute ontological positions. It 
repudiates the ontological positions advocating reality to be characterized by 
absolute identity in which difference is reduced to relative and secondary levels of 
reality. It similarly declines the ontological notions of absolute permanence which 
discard change as illusory.
5
 Additionally, Jain philosophers disagree with the 
ontologies of absolute difference which refute all relations of identity. They 
likewise oppose ontological stances of absolute change which pronounce 
permanence to be merely a secondary and artificial conception.
6
 Jainism instead 
adopts an intermediary approach, synthesizing the extreme ontological positions of 
absolute identity/permanence and absolute difference/change. Taking into account 
all of the four above-mentioned features of reality, Jainism, moreover, rejects the 
                                                 
1 The term ontology is employed in the broad sense of a theory of “what there is” (cf. Matilal 1977, 
92). The term reality will be used here in the same way. 
2 Kundakunda’s texts are composed in a Prākrit, which Richard Pischel (1849–1908), a German 
Indologist, termed “Jaina Śaurasenī.” Within the text, this article will employ the Sanskrit rendition 
of the Prākrit terms. The Prākrit originals will be quoted in the footnotes to Kundakunda’s gāthās. 
3 Also known as Tattvārthādigamasūtra. Umāsvāti compiled this text in Sanskrit, thus establishing a 
dialogue with the other contemporary Indian traditions and their doctrinal expositions in the sūtra 
form. 
4 In the footnotes to direct quotations from these four sources, the original text will be provided. 
Unless stated otherwise, all translations are the author’s.  
5 In the context of Indian philosophico-religious traditions, the ontological positions of absolute 
identity and absolute permanence are supported by various non-dualist (Skt. advaita) schools of 
thought. 
6 Both of the latter views are proposed by various Buddhist schools. 
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subordination of any one of these aspects of reality to the other,
7
 maintaining the 
relationship between the identical/permanent and the different/changing aspects of 
reality to be coordinated (Padmarajiah 1963, 123). None of the ontological 
features is therefore considered to be primary. Hence, what exists must be 
permanent, yet changing at the same time. Also, identity as well as difference may 
be recognized between various aspects of individual existents in time.  
In order to further clarify these four aspects of reality and their coordinative 
relationship, a preliminary examination of what it actually means “to be” or “to 
exist” for a Jain philosopher is required. The Jain ontological terminology 
referring to being or existence is commonly derived from the verbal root √as-8 the 
meaning of which is “to be,”9 “to exist” or “to be present.” A frequently used 
nominal derivative that will be discussed in this paper is sat. With reference to the 
verbal meaning, it may be translated as existence. What is existence according to 
Kundakunda and Umāsvāti? In Sas 5.2910 Umāsvāti refers to existence (Skt. sat) 
with regard to substance (Skt. dravya). The sūtra (“saddravyalakṣaṇam”) may be 
grammatically interpreted in two different ways.
11
 The compound dravyalakṣaṇam 
may be understood as a bahuvrīhi, describing existence (Skt. sat). In line with this, 
Umāsvāti would be maintaining that existence is that of which the mark (Skt. 
lakṣaṇa) is substance (Skt. dravya). In other words, existence is marked by 
substance. This interpretation corresponds to the Bimal Krishna Matilal’s 
translation of the sūtra as “What there is, has the nature of substance” (Matilal 
1977, 99). More commonly, however, the compound dravyalakṣaṇam is 
understood as a simple genitive tatpuruṣa. According to this interpretation, 
Umāsvāti defines existence as the mark of substance, implying that substance is 
something which exists. This understanding agrees with Nathmal Tatia’s 
translation of the sūtra as “Existence is the character of a substance” (Umāsvāti 
2011, 135) (cf. Ps I.18, II.5–6, II.13). Both possible grammatical analyses seem to 
describe an ontological picture which proposes the existence of a substance or 
several substances. According to the first interpretation, everything that exists is 
                                                 
7 As opposed to, for example, the views of sāṃkhya and viśiṣṭādvaita-vedānta.  
8 A great portion of nominal derivatives employed for Indian ontological discourse is also derived 
from the verbal root √bhū- “to be.” 
9 In his introduction to basic ontological terms of Indian philosophy, Wilhelm Halbfass, however, 
remarks that “[b]oth bhū and as have more prominent existential and veridical functions than to be; 
bhū has, moreover, dynamic implications” (Halbfass 1992, 22). The latter function is clearly 
indicated in the Sanskrit word for truth, namely satya.  
10  The reference is from a Digambara commentary to Umāsvāti’s Tattvārthasūtra called 
Sarvārthasiddhi, compiled by Pūjyapāda.  
11 The author would like to thank Chris Haskett for the helpful suggestions with these interpretations.  
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marked by substance. This implies that existence is necessarily indicated or 
expressed by substance, either one or many. According to the second interpretation, 
existence characterizes substance, meaning that a singular substance or a plurality 
of them exists. One need not at once opt for one of the two interpretations. Their 
(in)compatibility will be explicated once the qualitative and quantitative aspects of 
substance(s) as well as its/their place in the broader map of reality proposed by 
Kundakunda and Umāsvāti are brought to light.  
The term dravya here therefore proves to be a key concept for the 
understanding of the Jain theory of what there is, and, as will be demonstrated, of 
the coordinated relationship between both identity and difference as well as 
permanence and change in Jain ontology. In examining the nature of substance, 
two ways of looking at it need to be considered. One is its general non-temporal 
structure, i.e. its complete vertical cross-section. The other is its temporary 
character, i.e. its horizontal cross-section. The first will describe its principal 
components as well as illustrate a comprehensive picture of reality, namely the 
number of substances, their (dis)similarities and relation to one another. The 
second will reveal how substance functions in time and thereby explain the place 
of identity and difference as well as permanence and change in the proposed 
structure of reality.  
Umāsvāti defines substance through its relation to attribute (Skt. guṇa) and 
mode (Skt. paryāya): “Substance possesses attribute(s) and mode(s)”12 (Ts 5.37). 
By defining substance as possessing attribute(s) and mode(s), Umāsvāti presents 
the reader with three different relations, namely one between substance and 
attribute, one between substance and mode and one between attribute and mode. In 
the context of Jain thought, the general relation between substance on the one hand 
and attribute(s) and mode(s) on the other is not to be understood as one of 
subordination, i.e. substance does not ontologically precede attribute(s) and 
mode(s) which it is maintained to possess. It does not possess attribute(s) and 
mode(s) as substance would possess accidental predicates, while retaining its 
being independent of their existence. Regarding the relationship between 
substance, attribute and mode, Kundakunda states in gāthās 12 and 13 of 
Pañcāstikāyasāra that substance would no longer be substance without the other 
two, hence defining attribute and mode as inherent and indispensable features of 
substance. Additionally, he claims this dependence to be mutual. “Substance is not 
                                                 
12 guṇaparyāyavaddravyam / This definition is reminiscent of Vaiśeṣika-sūtra I.1.15, which defines 
substance as possessing action(s) and attribute(s) (Skt. kriyaguṇavat). 
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deprived of mode(s) nor are modes detached from substance(s). The being of both 
is not without the other, so expound the śramaṇas.”13 “Attributes are not without 
substance, substance is not found without attributes. Therefore, the nature of 
substance and attributes is non-separate.” 14  Hence, the non-temporal relation 
between substance on the one hand and attribute(s) and mode(s) on the other is not 
merely accidental, but essential. In that sense, they are said to be non-separate. 
Apart from indicating the relationship between substance, attribute and mode, 
these two gāthās additionally establish the plurality of attributes and modes. In the 
case of attributes Pks 13 discloses that a single substance is related to a plurality of 
attributes. From the point of view of an individual substance, the substance is 
therefore one, although it is simultaneously manifold from the view-point of the 
many attributes it possesses. In the case of modes, such relation is not yet clarified, 
even though a plurality of modes is spoken of in Pks 12. Moreover, the number of 
substances has not yet been ascertained.  
Even though Kundakunda establishes the relationship between the relata 
discussed as one of coordination (i.e. one is not subordinated to the other) and 
mutual dependence (i.e. there is no substance without attributes/modes and vice 
versa), this does not entail that they are identical to one another nor that the nature 
of the two sides of the relation is the same. The three aspects remain non-
exclusively distinct and substance is not to attribute what attribute is to substance 
(cf. Ps II.16), additionally, substance is not to mode what mode is to substance. To 
expand on this, the individual relationships outlined above need to be examined.  
The first relationship is one between substance and a plurality of attributes. 
According to Umāsvāti, substance functions as a support (Skt. āśraya) for 
attributes. This means that attributes are established owing to the fact that 
substance provides the footing for them. However, attributes cannot perform the 
same supportive function as substance since that would render them substances as 
well. “Attributes are those the foundation of which is [of/by] substance (and) 
which are without attribute(s)”15 (Ts 5.40). As far as the relation of attributes 
towards substance goes, Kundakunda claims that substances are “… described (as) 
having the character of attribute(s) …”16 (Ps II.1). Substance therefore functions as 
                                                 
13 pajjayavijudaṃ davvaṃ davvavijuttā ya pajjayā ṇatthi / doṇhaṃ aṇaṇṇabhūdaṃ bhāvaṃ samaṇā 
parūveṃti // (cf. Ps I.10, II.18). 
14 davveṇa viṇā ṇa guṇā guṇehiṃ davvaṃ viṇā ṇa saṃbhavadi / avvadiritto bhāvo davvaguṇāṇaṃ 
havadi tamhā // 
15 dravyāśrayā nirguṇā guṇāḥ / 
16 … guṇappagaṇi bhaṇidāni / … 
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a base for a number of attributes, which in turn characterize it. In addition to 
explaining the relationship between substance and attribute, this gāthā (indirectly) 
refers to a plurality of substances. This means that the Jain ontological model 
proposes numerous substances which are characterized by several attributes and 
each of which is essentially related to at least one mode. In Jainism, attributes are 
generally understood to function as essential factors by which a certain substance 
is differentiated from the ones belonging to another substantial genus.
17
 Through 
the characterizing function of attributes, a relation of relative identity or relative 
difference may be recognized between various substances. Substances with 
different attributes are considered to belong to different classes of substances (cf. 
Ss 103). Substances of the same genus share the same attributes and from that 
view-point they are matching. Nonetheless, substances from the same class are not 
completely identical to one another. They are merely corresponding from the point 
of view of attributes which are, as will be demonstrated by the temporal model of 
substances, co-extensive with substances.  
Now it is possible to account for the difference between substances in so far as 
they belong to distinct genera. However, the following gāthā from Kundakunda, 
speaks of the difference on another level: “Regarding the object of substance, 
every substance is non-different. However, regarding the object of its mode(s), 
(every substance) is different …”18 (Ps II.22). To begin with, this gāthā speaks of 
non-difference between substances. However, this non-difference is not to be 
understood in the sense that has just been considered, i.e. in the sense of likeness 
between substances belonging to the same genus, but more generally, namely non-
difference in so far as they are substances. The gāthā continues by referring to a 
distinction between substances. Not only are substances different as far as they 
belong to groups characterized by different attributes, they are different as 
individual substances in so far as they possess distinct modes.
19
 The factor which 
functions as differentia for distinguishing substances within the same genus is 
their mode. In other words, mode is that particular aspect of substance that 
presents its differentiating factor. But what is substance to its mode(s)? 
                                                                                                                           
 
17 This will be further clarified once particular substances proposed by Kundakunda and Umāsvāti 
are examined.  
18 davvaṭṭhieṇa savvaṃ davvaṃ taṃ pajjayaṭṭhieṇa guṇo / havadi ya aṇṇamaṇaṇṇaṃ … // 
19 Jayandra Soni points out that within Jainism the term guṇa developed later than paryāya, perhaps 
both for the reason of outlining a complete and precise ontological model as well as due to the 
influence of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system which operated with the term (Soni 1991, 75, cf. Upadhye 
1984, 63). 
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Kundakunda holds: “... [S]ubstance is the substratum of attributes and 
mode(s) …”20 (Ps I.87). Substances are then not only the foundation for attributes 
but also the ground for mode(s). The ontological model elaborated so far therefore 
consists of substances supporting attributes and mode(s), which respectively 
provide them with general and specific qualifications. All substances are non-
different from each other as far as they are substances. Based on the attributes they 
possess, they may be classified into various groups. Within particular groups they 
may be further distinguished by specific modes they support. The number of 
modes as particular manifestations of substances will be clarified once the 
temporal picture of substances is presented.  
The last relation to be explicated is the one between attributes and modes. 
Similarly to what has been said for the relation between substance on the one hand 
and attributes and mode(s) on the other, likewise attributes are not to modes what 
modes are to attributes. Attributes on the one hand act as formative domains 
within which modes can manifest themselves. Modes on the other hand offer 
particular manifestations of general attributes. This will be better illustrated by 
bringing particular substances into discussion.  
Substances are said to be infinite in number (cf. Ps I.49). Apart from a class 
containing sentient substances (Skt. jīva), Kundakunda and Umāsvāti speak of 
five
21
 classes of insentient (Skt. ajīva) substances. “Substance is living (and) non-
living. The living is, furthermore, constituted of the application of consciousness. 
The non-living is non-conscious and the foremost (of it) is matter”22 (Ps II.35). 
Among insentient substances matter (Skt. pudgala) is insentient and material, 
whereas space (Skt. ākāśa), the medium of motion (skt. dharma), the medium of 
rest (Skt. adharma) and time (Skt. kāla) are insentient and immaterial. In the 
words of Kundakunda: “Living substances, extensive substances of matter, the 
medium of motion, the medium of rest, space and time, conjoined with various 
attributes and mode(s), are said to be the principles”23 (Ns 9). As implied above, 
all of these substances are non-different to the extent of being substances. 
                                                 
20 … guṇapajjayāṇaṃ appā davva … // (cf. Ps II.9). 
21  It ought to be pointed out that whereas Digambaras accept time as a separate substance, 
Śvetāmbaras are divided regarding the inclusion of time in the list of substances (cf. Ts 5.38, Sas 
5.39). 
22 davvaṃ jīvamajīvaṃ jīvo puṇa cedaṇovajogamao / poggaladavvappamuhaṃ acedaṇaṃ havadi 
ajjīvaṃ // 
23 jīvā poggalakāyā dhammādhammā ya kāla āyāsaṃ / taccatthā idi bhaṇidā ṇāṇāguṇapajjaehiṃ 
saṃjuttā // Although not clearly indicated in this gāthā, the substance of time is considered to be the 
only non-extensive substance.  
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However, the essential attributes they possess are the criteria for classifying them 
into various genera of substances. In the words of Kundakunda: “The features by 
which the living and non-living substance are discerned, are to be known as 
concrete and non-concrete atributes, particular to their nature”24 (Ps II.38). For 
example, all the substances in the genus of sentient substances possess 
innumerable non-concrete attributes, the basic ones of which are consciousness 
(Skt. caitanya), bliss (Skt. sukha) and energy (Skt. vīrya). These attributes differ 
from the essential attributes of each of the non-sentient substances. The sentient 
substances may also be differentiated from one another, that is, by the modes they 
possess. In the case of sentient substances and their attributes, a specific mode is 
the degree to which one of its essential attributes is manifested. For example, 
sentient substances vary according to different manifestations of their attribute of 
consciousness.  
So far, a rudimentary picture of Jain ontology has been constructed. While the 
relationship between substance and existence remains to be clarified, the structure 
of substance in its vertical dimension has been demonstrated by explicating the 
nature of relations between substance and its aspects, i.e. attributes and mode(s). 
Furthermore, relations between various substances have been explained. The next 
step is to study both existence and substance in time, that is, to explicate their 
horizontal cross-sections. This will introduce the notions of permanence and 
change. Moreover, the nature of qualitative identity and qualitative difference as 
pertaining to a numerically identical substance in time will be explicated. Since 
Jain ontology avoids siding with both the ontology of absolute 
permanence/identity and the ontology of absolute change/difference, it is here vital 
to ask two questions. First, which aspects of existence are changing and which 
remain the same, and second, in what way does this dynamic relate to the 
substance-attribute-mode structure. Moreover, these two questions may be 
rephrased in order to address the concepts of identity and difference. Which 
aspects of substances remain qualitatively identical and which qualitatively differ 
in time? The examination of both the temporal natures of existence and substance 
will shed additional light on the relationship between the two. 
After introducing the terms substance and existence (explicated above), 
Umāsvāti continues with the definition of existence (Skt. sat) in sūtra 5.29. He 
holds it to be three-fold. “Existence is joined with origination, cessation and 
                                                 
24 liṃgehiṃ jehiṃ davvaṃ jīvamajīvaṃ ca havadi viṇṇādaṃ / te'tabbhāvavisiṭṭhā muttāmuttā guṇā 
ṇeyā // 
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persistence”25 (Ts 5.29). What there is, is characterized by change (i.e. origination 
and cessation) and stability (i.e. persistence). This implies that according to Jain 
doctrine, the model of persistence through change may function as a universal 
model, i.e. a model pertaining to the whole of existence. Persistence (Skt. 
dhrauvya) is the lasting or enduring aspect of existence, which means the Jain 
model of reality cannot be reduced to one of continuous origination and cessation 
of phenomena, devoid of a stable underlying substratum. In line with this, 
Kundakunda maintains that origination and destruction can only occur on the basis 
of something persistent. It is impossible for them to take place independently of a 
permanent foundation which persists through changes. “Production is not deprived 
of destruction and neither is destruction deprived of (being with) production. 
Moreover, origination and destruction are not without a persistent object.”26 (Ps 
II.8)
 
Not only is it asserted that origination and destruction are not deprived of 
each other, but also that none of them is possible without a continual base upon 
which to occur. Origination and cessation therefore occur on a permanent 
foundation. It may thus be deduced that in accordance with Jainism, origination 
(Skt. utpāda) is never a creatio ex nihilo but merely a taking up of a new form and, 
similarly, cessation (Skt. vyaya) is never a complete vanishing but merely a 
disappearance of an old form.  
The persistent aspect of existence is referred to in Ts 5.30 where Umāsvāti 
defines what being eternal entails. “Eternal is the imperishable in its nature.”27 As 
indicated above, the ground of change is that which is imperishable. An existent in 
time thus remains qualitatively identical despite simultaneously going through 
qualitative change. It is therefore both qualitatively identical and qualitatively 
different at distinct moments in time. This analysis of reality thus proposes change 
to be some form of transformation as opposed to a radical beginning of something 
entirely new or a radical ending with nothing left behind. Existents persevere 
through transformations, which manifest as originations of new forms and 
cessations of past forms.  
The question of the frequency of their changing, however, remains. Does 
change happen only occasionally or does it occur regularly? Moreover, if it takes 
                                                 
25 utpādavyayadhrauvyayuktaṃ sat / The past passive participle yukta may also be translated as 
“connected to,” “coupled with,” “engaged in,” “endowed with,” “accompanied with,” “possessed of” 
etc.  
26 ṇa bhavo bhaṅgavihīṇo bhaṅgo vā ṇatthi saṃbhavavihīṇo / uppādo vi ya bhaṅgo ṇa viṇā dhovveṇa 
attheṇa // 
27 tadbhāvāvyayaṃ nityam / 
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place regularly, is this regularity momentary or marked by some other time-unit? 
Kundakunda explains: “In the world, being the source of momentary destruction, 
nothing is produced (from), nor comes to, nothing. What is production, that is 
disappearance. Birth and disappearance are therefore different”28 (Ps II.27). Once 
again he highlights that origination and destruction are not absolute in nature. He 
also indicates that change happens momentarily and additionally draws attention 
to a logical consequence of this occurrence, namely origination and cessation 
being exclusive of one another. The occurrence of one implies the loss of the other 
since in a particular moment only one may prevail. This remains compatible with 
their not being deprived of each other, since one may not arise without the loss of 
the other. It is this succession of origination and cessation that occurs momentarily. 
Momentariness of transformations agrees with the Jain ontological model 
proposing a coordinative relationship between permanence and change. For 
permanence and change to be considered coordinated, it not only follows that the 
permanent aspects of reality must be changing but that they are, in fact, incessantly 
doing so. In other words, change must be a constant inherent feature of the 
permanent principle. 
The next step is to examine how all the three aspects of existence, namely 
origination, persistence and cessation, feature in substance. Gāthā 10 of 
Kundakunda’s Pañcāstikāyasāra articulates the meaning of substance with a 
reference to them: “Whatever is … conjoined with origination, cessation and 
persistency … is substance.” 29  This illustration of substance agrees with the 
Sanskrit word for substance, i.e. dravya, being a nominal derivative from the 
verbal root √dru-, meaning “to flow,” “to flee,” “to run,” “to become fluid.” 
Substance is thus something that persists through perpetual change. Umāsvāti 
terms this kind of changing persistence pariṇāma, i.e. transformation. 
 He claims it to be the very nature of substance: “The nature of that (i.e. 
substance) is transformation” 30  (Ts 5.41). Kundakunda agrees: “They say a 
substance is that which is conjoined with origination, cessation and persistency, 
                                                 
28 jāyadi ṇeva ṇa ṇassadi khaṇabhaṅgasamubbhave jaṇe koī / jo hi bhavo so vilao saṃbhavavilaya 
tti te ṇāṇā // 
29 davvaṃ …  uppādavvayadhuvattasaṃjuttaṃ / … 
30 tadbhāvaḥ pariṇāmaḥ / 
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without leaving its nature, endowed with attribute(s) and accompanied by 
mode(s)”31 (Ps II.3). 
It is explained that substance is conjoined with origination, cessation and 
persistency, namely the very characteristics of existence. How then are substance 
and existence related? Is it safe to assume that since origination, decay and 
persistence are explicated as the essential constituents of existence they must 
characterize substance also, substance being in some fundamental way related to 
existence? Kundakunda holds that the relationship between substance and 
existence is the following: “The nature of existence is indeed the own-nature of 
substance with attributes (and) its own various modes, (which are) for all time 
having origination, cessation and persistency”32 (Ps II.4). The temporal dynamics 
of existence and substance therefore prove to be uniform since the nature of 
existence is the very own-nature of substance.  
Textual analysis therefore supports the notion of substance being that which is 
characterized by existence in the sense that the two share the same natures. This is 
the second interpretation proposed at the beginning of this paper. Bimal Krishna 
Matilal sums up the substance-existence quandary: “The Jainas … identify the 
notion of ‘it is’ or ‘it exists’ with that of substance, and they then explain that ‘it is’ 
means that it is endowed with the triple character of origin, decay and stability” 
(Matilal 1977, 100). However, this notion is perfectly compatible with the first 
interpretation according to which everything that exists is substantial in nature. 
Kundakunda refers to objects in the following manner: “An object is made up of 
substances, which are described (as) having the character of attributes and with 
which, moreover, are modes”33 (Ps II.1). This is paraphrased earlier in the text: 
“… An existent object abides in substance(s), attributes and modes”34 (Ps I.10). 
Every existing object is therefore expressed as substance. This means that both of 
the interpretations may be taken as correct. The nature of existence is persistency 
through change and since existence is the own-nature of substance, persistency 
through change is also characteristic of substance. This is furthermore true for 
                                                 
31 apariccattasahāveṇuppādavvayadhuvattasaṃjuttaṃ / guṇavaṃ ca sapajjāyaṃ jaṃ taṃ davvaṃ ti 
vuccaṃti // 
32  sabbhāvo hi sahāvo guṇehiṃ saha pajjaehiṃ cittehiṃ / davvassa savvakālaṃ 
uppādavvayadhuvattehiṃ // 
33 attho khalu davvamao davvāṇi guṇappagāṇi bhaṇidāṇi / tehiṃ puṇo pajjāyā … // It should here be 
noted that Jainism is a realist school of thought.  
34 … davvaguṇapajjayattho  attho atthittaṇivvatto // 
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every existing object which is necessarily expressed through the substance-
attribute-mode structure.  
It has so far been clarified that substances are constituted by general 
characteristics which are attributes, and specific characteristics which are modes. 
It has furthermore been stated that substances are that which is permanent and 
persists through change. This is the identity aspect of reality (cf. Ss 308). What 
then of attributes and modes? Which of them are persistent and which are 
momentarily changing? It could be deduced from the explication of their functions 
above that attributes as the general characteristics of substances must co-exist with 
the substances they characterize. This would imply that they are, like substances, 
permanent and remain identical through time. Modes, however, as particular 
manifestations of attributes and thus specific characteristics of substances could 
then potentially be changing. Kundakunda supports this presumption: “Origination, 
continuity and destruction are in modes” 35  (Ps II.9). Modes are the changing 
aspects of substances. However, how does this relate to the above-quoted gāthā 
which maintained that there may be no substance without mode? It has been stated 
that substances may never be deprived of a mode as such and in that sense modes 
are essential to them. Nevertheless, single, particular modes are not essential but 
accidental characteristics of substances. They are lost every moment and substance 
in no way partakes in that loss. Furthermore, at a specific moment of its occurence, 
a particular mode is also always a manifestation of the permanent base upon which 
it occurs. The permanent foundations supporting modes persist through the 
changing of their accidental modes. It is perhaps in this way that Kundakunda 
claims that not only origination and destruction, but also continuity takes place in 
modes.
36
 Substances and their attributes therefore maintain their identity whereas 
modes are different in each moment of time. It may thus be deduced that modes of 
a single substance are not only many but potentially infinite (cf. Ps I.49).  
According to the Jain theory of reality, each of the many existing objects is 
therefore substantial in nature. Substances may be classified into six different 
kinds, however, they all have the same basic structure. All of them possess 
permanent general qualifiers, namely attributes, and continually changing specific 
qualifiers, namely modes. Substances themselves are permanent like the attributes 
                                                 
35 uppādaṭṭhidibhaṅgā vijjaṃte pajjaesu … / … 
36 Bimal Krishna Matilal distinguishes between persistency which is coupled with origination and 
destruction on the one hand and permanence as the immutable nature of substance, which is the base 
for the happening of the previous three (Matilal 1977, 100). 
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they possess. This temporal structure of substances, attributes and modes thus 
reflects the coordinative model of Jain ontology. This means that everything which 
exists is not only permanent and identical but also differs in time since the 
permanent base continually undergoes modal change.  
 
Abbreviations 
Ns – Niyamasāra (Kundakunda) 
Pks – Pañcāstikāyasāra (Kundakunda) 
Ps – Pravacanasāra (Kundakunda) 
Sas – Sarvārthasiddhi (Pūjyapāda) 
Ss – Samayasāra (Kundakunda) 
Ts – Tattvārthasūtra (Umāsvāti) 
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